Bullshirt (not a typo): You should tell everyone because of Pascal's Wager and respect for individual conscience. There is a great good in letting people know they only have short time to live: They can make amends for past wrong doing, make final apologies, complete their most important projects, and repent of their sins. By not telling everyone, almost everyone will delay the most important decisions of their lives to a future they'll never have.
The most important of these decisions is the decision to repent and attempt a deathbed conversion. Even if you judge there to be a tiny chance that anyone's actions before the asteroid hits will have any effect on their final salvation, there is a small chance it might, and, if it does, the consequences for that person are either infinitely bad or infinitely good. Given this, you ought to give people the information that will potentially spur them on to pursue God and avoid damnation.
There is an argument to this effect even if you think Pascal's Wager is bad argument: given that many others will disagree with you, and find Pascal's reasoning kosher, you should respect their religious autonomy by telling them what they'd want to know. Given how fundamental respecting religious commitments is to respecting each other's dignity of conscience, other people ought to be the ones to decide whether to form religious commitments before they die.
(You might object that it's false that "many" will find Pascal's reasoning kosher, since few people know about Pascal's Wager. However, while this is so in the sense that few people know about the philosophical argument, many if not most religious people in the real world have arrived at something like the Wager independently--something very much like Pascal's Wager ("If I don't, big loss, if I do, what's the harm?") motivates many real-world religious commitments.)
This objection appeals both to utility maximization and respecting core conscientious decisions, so it can appeal to both consequentialists and deontologists.
Interesting objections. Sure, letting everyone know will probably benefit some people but I still don’t see why telling everyone is the right thing to do when similar, although admittedly not equivalent, knowledge is already accessible to, if not already possessed by, everyone. I cannot be morally responsible that people are taking their lives for granted but I can be morally responsible if I share with someone knowledge that leads to unnecessary and totally preventable harm.
If a murderous mob knocks on my door seeking to know the whereabouts of a certain individual, that I know the location of, I’m justified to withhold that knowledge from the murderous mob. Of course it isn’t the same but I feel like the right thing to do is to withhold knowledge of the end of the world from everyone, since no one can be harmed by instant annihilation and there’s a week in which many unnecessary harms can occur, for which I’d be morally responsible for.
I’d want to tell some people but the only way I can be sure of preventing it getting out to more people is to tell no one and keep it to myself.
You're only responsible for the foreseeable harm if it isn't covered under double effect. In this case, I think it is: the resulting evil is not disproportionate to the intended good.
Also, if your morally responsible for spreading information that psychologically nudges people to choose to do bad things that they were already capable of doing, you are equally responsible for not not spreading information that would psychologically nudge people to do freely choose to do good things that they were already capable of doing.
I dunno, mate, we’re primates and so, given our species propensity for violence, it seems rather disproportionate. Historically, even recently, humans who believed that armageddon is coming have carried out completely unnecessary horrors. But let’s assume you’re correct about the double effect and consider the following thought experiment:
Suppose some lady is sitting on a park bench listening to music. She has great noise cancelling headphones, so she cannot hear anyone around her. You’re walking by and you notice a meteor overhead that’s hurling directly towards her. You shout to get her attention but she cannot hear you and, despite your best efforts, she’s instantaneously annihilated without ever having had knowledge that she was about to be killed. It’s not obvious that she suffered whatsoever.
On the other hand, suppose she didn’t have headphones on and heard your shouts to get out of the way. Unfortunately, for her, she froze up like a deer in headlights. She knew she was about to be hit by a meteor and she couldn’t move herself. She just had to endure 10 or 20 seconds of thinking about her impending doom.
In both cases the lady sitting on the park bench will die, but, in only one, does she seem to suffer.
In the thought experiment about the Sun, such suffering is, of course, many orders of magnitude greater. It is also completely avoidable if you just keep the information to yourself. So, it seems like the right thing to do is let people be ignorant about their imminent annihilation. That way, the least amount of suffering is achieved.
Lastly, I don’t know, some have argued that we are morally obligated not to spread, even beneficial, information, since that violates people’s autonomy to be able to discover and do things for themselves. (I don’t know if that argument works though; will need to find the original paper and reread it)
(1) I get that it would be worse in cases where it’s 20 seconds away and people freeze up. But that doesn’t do anything to undermine the claim that, say, we should tell everyone about the asteroid when it’s a day away. In that case, you’ll cause suffering, but it’ll be more that justified--in fact, causing the suffering is obligatory. The example is a red herring.
(2) The paper, if it argues for a position that broad, sounds cretinous: as stated, the view implies that it’s wrong for the government to make a public safety announcement.
When is causing unnecessary suffering obligatory? I can see how allowing unnecessary suffering can, in some cases, be permissible but I don’t see how causing unnecessary suffering can be morally obligatory?
Many people think that the government has a mandate to serve its citizens so, yeah, I get what you mean. Interestingly, private citizens are not usually expected to serve the interests of others.
(1) A lot of ambiguity baked into the word “unnecessary”: the suffering is a necessary byproduct if you want to do right by others. For instance, you’re morally obligated to tell a patient the risks of a proposed medical treatment, even if you know that they’ll tell their family and thereby cause them distress. Are you causing the family unnecessary suffering? Depends what you mean by “necessary”. But obviously you’re doing the right thing. Same goes in end of the world case.
(2) Since when? And even if that were descriptively true of what most people think about what their citizens should do, which it isn’t, citizens should obviously serve the interests of others.
Amos, there's just one more point about the infinitely bad or good consequences for those people who by knowing about the end of the world would then be motivated to take, or at least seriously consider, Pascal's wager and, perhaps, achieve salvation.
Can't remember where but I've heard that the Problem of Evil is what leads most people away from belief in God (and supposed salvation). Let's assume that that is indeed the case. I wonder whether not telling anyone and, hence, preventing so much evil from occurring, would actually maximize the number of believers and people who are "saved" from eternal damnation. If so, then, it seems like, again, the right thing to do would be to not tell anyone. What do you think about that?
Bullshirt (not a typo): You should tell everyone because of Pascal's Wager and respect for individual conscience. There is a great good in letting people know they only have short time to live: They can make amends for past wrong doing, make final apologies, complete their most important projects, and repent of their sins. By not telling everyone, almost everyone will delay the most important decisions of their lives to a future they'll never have.
The most important of these decisions is the decision to repent and attempt a deathbed conversion. Even if you judge there to be a tiny chance that anyone's actions before the asteroid hits will have any effect on their final salvation, there is a small chance it might, and, if it does, the consequences for that person are either infinitely bad or infinitely good. Given this, you ought to give people the information that will potentially spur them on to pursue God and avoid damnation.
There is an argument to this effect even if you think Pascal's Wager is bad argument: given that many others will disagree with you, and find Pascal's reasoning kosher, you should respect their religious autonomy by telling them what they'd want to know. Given how fundamental respecting religious commitments is to respecting each other's dignity of conscience, other people ought to be the ones to decide whether to form religious commitments before they die.
(You might object that it's false that "many" will find Pascal's reasoning kosher, since few people know about Pascal's Wager. However, while this is so in the sense that few people know about the philosophical argument, many if not most religious people in the real world have arrived at something like the Wager independently--something very much like Pascal's Wager ("If I don't, big loss, if I do, what's the harm?") motivates many real-world religious commitments.)
This objection appeals both to utility maximization and respecting core conscientious decisions, so it can appeal to both consequentialists and deontologists.
Interesting objections. Sure, letting everyone know will probably benefit some people but I still don’t see why telling everyone is the right thing to do when similar, although admittedly not equivalent, knowledge is already accessible to, if not already possessed by, everyone. I cannot be morally responsible that people are taking their lives for granted but I can be morally responsible if I share with someone knowledge that leads to unnecessary and totally preventable harm.
If a murderous mob knocks on my door seeking to know the whereabouts of a certain individual, that I know the location of, I’m justified to withhold that knowledge from the murderous mob. Of course it isn’t the same but I feel like the right thing to do is to withhold knowledge of the end of the world from everyone, since no one can be harmed by instant annihilation and there’s a week in which many unnecessary harms can occur, for which I’d be morally responsible for.
I’d want to tell some people but the only way I can be sure of preventing it getting out to more people is to tell no one and keep it to myself.
You're only responsible for the foreseeable harm if it isn't covered under double effect. In this case, I think it is: the resulting evil is not disproportionate to the intended good.
Also, if your morally responsible for spreading information that psychologically nudges people to choose to do bad things that they were already capable of doing, you are equally responsible for not not spreading information that would psychologically nudge people to do freely choose to do good things that they were already capable of doing.
I dunno, mate, we’re primates and so, given our species propensity for violence, it seems rather disproportionate. Historically, even recently, humans who believed that armageddon is coming have carried out completely unnecessary horrors. But let’s assume you’re correct about the double effect and consider the following thought experiment:
Suppose some lady is sitting on a park bench listening to music. She has great noise cancelling headphones, so she cannot hear anyone around her. You’re walking by and you notice a meteor overhead that’s hurling directly towards her. You shout to get her attention but she cannot hear you and, despite your best efforts, she’s instantaneously annihilated without ever having had knowledge that she was about to be killed. It’s not obvious that she suffered whatsoever.
On the other hand, suppose she didn’t have headphones on and heard your shouts to get out of the way. Unfortunately, for her, she froze up like a deer in headlights. She knew she was about to be hit by a meteor and she couldn’t move herself. She just had to endure 10 or 20 seconds of thinking about her impending doom.
In both cases the lady sitting on the park bench will die, but, in only one, does she seem to suffer.
In the thought experiment about the Sun, such suffering is, of course, many orders of magnitude greater. It is also completely avoidable if you just keep the information to yourself. So, it seems like the right thing to do is let people be ignorant about their imminent annihilation. That way, the least amount of suffering is achieved.
Lastly, I don’t know, some have argued that we are morally obligated not to spread, even beneficial, information, since that violates people’s autonomy to be able to discover and do things for themselves. (I don’t know if that argument works though; will need to find the original paper and reread it)
(1) I get that it would be worse in cases where it’s 20 seconds away and people freeze up. But that doesn’t do anything to undermine the claim that, say, we should tell everyone about the asteroid when it’s a day away. In that case, you’ll cause suffering, but it’ll be more that justified--in fact, causing the suffering is obligatory. The example is a red herring.
(2) The paper, if it argues for a position that broad, sounds cretinous: as stated, the view implies that it’s wrong for the government to make a public safety announcement.
When is causing unnecessary suffering obligatory? I can see how allowing unnecessary suffering can, in some cases, be permissible but I don’t see how causing unnecessary suffering can be morally obligatory?
Many people think that the government has a mandate to serve its citizens so, yeah, I get what you mean. Interestingly, private citizens are not usually expected to serve the interests of others.
(1) A lot of ambiguity baked into the word “unnecessary”: the suffering is a necessary byproduct if you want to do right by others. For instance, you’re morally obligated to tell a patient the risks of a proposed medical treatment, even if you know that they’ll tell their family and thereby cause them distress. Are you causing the family unnecessary suffering? Depends what you mean by “necessary”. But obviously you’re doing the right thing. Same goes in end of the world case.
(2) Since when? And even if that were descriptively true of what most people think about what their citizens should do, which it isn’t, citizens should obviously serve the interests of others.
Amos, there's just one more point about the infinitely bad or good consequences for those people who by knowing about the end of the world would then be motivated to take, or at least seriously consider, Pascal's wager and, perhaps, achieve salvation.
Can't remember where but I've heard that the Problem of Evil is what leads most people away from belief in God (and supposed salvation). Let's assume that that is indeed the case. I wonder whether not telling anyone and, hence, preventing so much evil from occurring, would actually maximize the number of believers and people who are "saved" from eternal damnation. If so, then, it seems like, again, the right thing to do would be to not tell anyone. What do you think about that?
What an interesting (and terrifying) thought experiment! I love the comments debating the "right" thing to do. Great share!
Thank you (: