Rights, Epistemic Hurdles, and Assisted Death
I recently nominated David Benatar for the Berggruen Prize, but that doesn’t mean I endorse all of his views. For example, I don’t accept his antinatalist conclusion that it’s always morally wrong to procreate; though, given an estimated 150 million orphans worldwide, adoption sure seems like a better option. But, anyway, there are other views of his, pertaining to rights and assisted death, that I whole-heartedly endorse.
Everyone dies and some of us, for whatever reason, prefer not to wait around for a natural, potentially painful, death. The question, then, is do we have a right to die?
Interestingly, Benatar argues that a right to die isn’t very helpful for thinking about such cases. Instead, he insists on thinking about it from the perspective of a right to life. To understand why Benatar prefers a right to life over a right to die, it’s important to first consider why we even have rights at all.
There are many different theories of rights. Some think rights protect our interests. Others think that rights enable our choices. According to Benatar, however, it doesn’t matter which theory you prefer because, in any case, a right is something that a right-holder should be able to waive.
For example, suppose Sergei owns a hockey stick such that he has an exclusive right to use it. Sergei can decide to waive his right if, say, he were to loan or sell his hockey stick. In that way, a right can either protect Sergei’s interests or enable him to decide for himself what he wants to do with his hockey stick. So, it doesn’t matter which theory you prefer, the effects would be the same.
Now suppose, rather tragically, Sergei is diagnosed with a terminal illness such that the end of his life will be unbearably painful. The problem with a right to die is that it doesn’t seem like something Sergei can waive. So, if continuing to live is in Sergei’s interest or what he’d choose to do, then a right to die fails to serve his interests or enable his choices. So that’s why Benatar prefers a right to life over a right to die. But that’s just the tip of the iceberg.
Some people, for whatever reason, are not able to end their own lives, even though living is no longer in their interest or what, under normal circumstances, they’d choose to do, so they require assistance in bringing about their own death. And this brings us to one more point of agreement between Benatar and myself: epistemic hurdles for assisted death.
Why am I bringing this to your attention? Because, in my local news, someone was recently accused of selling a chemical, which is normally used for food processing, to vulnerable people at risk of ending their lives. So, in effect, this person is assisting people in committing suicide and I believe that that is highly irresponsible and morally wrong.
Like Benatar, I think that, in order to secure such assistance, you need to first clear some epistemic hurdles, and prove to others that living is actually no longer in your interest or what you most want to do with your life. I don’t blame any of those people who are seeking such assistance but the person providing the assistance, if they are not in an epistemic position to know or justifiably believe that providing others with such assistance actually serves their interests or enables their choices, then it seems like the obviously wrong thing to do.